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ABSTRACT 
Erinn Crider: The FPÖ’s Role in Reshaping Social Assistance in Austria 
(Under the direction of Robert Jenkins and Friederike Römer) 
The Freedom Party of Austria, as a populist radical right party, has reshaped the Austrian 
social assistance system. The FPÖ’s electoral success and participation at the Federal and 
Länder level has led to a shift in the range of acceptable social policies for mainstream parties. 
In order to demonstrate how the FPÖ has concretely affected social policies in Austria, this 
thesis will follow the development and eventual failure of the Means Tested Minimum Income 
Reform (MMI). Utilizing data from the Manifesto Project, newspaper articles, party manifestos 
and election data this thesis illustrates that as the FPÖ gained electoral success, beginning in 
2015, the mainstream parties began shifting their policy preferences rightwards and towards 
welfare chauvinism and welfare limitation, resulting in the failure of MMI. This stands in 
contrast to the initial negotiations surrounding MMI, which occurred in 2008 during a period 
where the FPÖ had reduced electoral success and influence. 
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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION
In the case of Austria, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), has been remarkably 
successful electorally and this electoral success has translated into a strong effect on the 
Austrian social policy both broadly and in terms of individual reforms. Since the 1940’s 
Austria’s political system was defined by a stable two party system divided between the 
Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ). Working in a 
unique federal system built on cooperation, both formal and informal, the stable system 
allowed for reforms and policy change through negotiations. The FPÖ’s electoral success 
disrupted and reshaped this system. 
I break new ground in this thesis by arguing that the FPÖ, as a Populist Radical Right 
Party (PRRP), has reshaped the post-war Austrian social policy. The party’s electoral success 
and participation at the Federal and Länder level has led to distinct shift in the Overton 
Window, or range of acceptable policies, for the mainstream parties. In order to demonstrate 
how the FPÖ has concretely affected social policies in Austria, my analysis will follow the 
development and eventual failure of the Means Tested Minimum Income Reform (MMI). Prior 
to MMI, Austria had federal provisions establishing social assistance, but as a federalist state, 
Austria’s nine provinces or Länder controlled the funding, administration and specific 
legislation over the program. This resulted in highly variable and often unpredictable levels of 
social assistance across Austria. 
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The goal of the MMI reform, pushed through by Austria’s center-left party the SPÖ, was to 
harmonize social assistance benefits across Austria and fight poverty in the country as a whole by 
establishing a uniform minimum income scheme. 
Unlike Austria’s mainstream parties, the FPÖ has defined itself along new political issues 
such as immigration. As a result, one of the most defining characteristics of the party is its’ 
welfare chauvinist stance, or the stance that welfare access should be restricted to ‘deserving’ 
natives. MMI was negotiated and passed in 2010, while the FPÖ was in a relative electoral slump 
and renegotiated in 2015 after the “Refugee Crisis” made immigration an extremely salient issue, 
catapulting the FPÖ to electoral success. The timing of this reform and the salient nature of its 
content, social assistance, makes MMI an ideal tool for demonstrating the FPÖ’s influence on 
Austrian policy making.  
In order to support my hypothesis that the FPÖ’s electoral success has led to a reshaping 
of Austrian social policy I will first provide an overview of Austrian federalism, the Austrian 
party system and the history of the FPÖ. Before exploring how the FPÖ has impacted Austrian 
politics, it is helpful to first understand the unique system that the parties operate within. The 
next section will detail the data and methods that support this thesis, including a detailed 
description of case study selection. Following this, I will begin to trace how the MMI reform was 
developed and eventually failed. In doing this I will highlight the FPÖ’s participation in 
government and party stances on social assistance in the three core stages of Pre MMI, MMI 
Enacted and Post MMI. In following this timeline it will illuminate how FPÖ electoral success 
and participation in government at the Federal and Länder levels results in mainstream parties 




Austria has a federal system of government, beginning with the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
which relied heavily on municipal authority (Karlhofer, 2015, 60). In this system the Empire 
laid out laws, but municipalities had the responsibility of interpreting and enforcing these laws. 
This system persisted through the fall of the Habsburg Empire after WWI, when the crown 
lands were renamed the Länder of the Austrian Federation on October 1, 1920, when the 
Federal Constitution was accepted (Erk, 2004, 6). The system was again maintained after WWII 
(Err, 2004, 6). In the current system all of the powers and responsibilities are between the 
federal government (Bund), provincial governments (Länder), and the municipalities 
(Gemeinden) as described in the Austrian Constitution.  
On the federal level, like many other European countries, Austria has a parliamentary 
system. The President, is largely a symbolic figure that is elected every six years. Though the 
President’s powers are limited, the election is an important measure of voter’s preferences prior 
to parliamentary elections. The true political power of the country lies in its bicameral 
parliament. The Nationalrat (National Assembly) is the main legislative body. Members are 
elected every five years and the National Assembly is responsible for writing and passing 
legislative acts. It is also within this body that the Austrian government is formed. In order for a 
government to be formed and a Chancellor to be appointed, one group must hold the majority of 
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seats in the National Assembly. If this is not accomplished by a single party, as is often the case, 
a coalition must be formed. If these coalitions break down new elations can be called outside of 
the regular 5 year cycle. 
The Bundesrat (Federal Council) is the secondary and much weaker branch of the 
parliament that represents Länder interests (Bussjäger, 2018,187). The Federal Council is 
composed of representatives from each Länder based on population with the largest having 12 
representatives and smallest having 3 (Bussjäger, 2018,187). The Governors of each Land is also 
able to participate in proceedings, in particular through rotating 6 month chairmanships 
(Bussjäger, 2018, 190). The main power of the Federal Council is the ability to veto legislative 
acts passed in the National Assembly, however this veto is rarely used and can be easily 
overturned in the National Assembly by a repeated resolution (Bussjäger, 2018, 187). As 
described by Karlhofer (2015, 63), between 2000 and 2014, there were only 24 vetoes in the 
Federal Council and all of them were overruled by the National Assembly. This unequal division 
of power has significant implications for Austrian politics. The relative weakness of the Federal 
Council has pushed Länder to pursue power in other avenues, such as administrative power and 
informal cooperation.  
While the legislative powers of the Länder are relatively weak in the Federal Council,  
the constitution does outline specific powers for the Länder that are outside of the federal scope. 
Most federal powers are outlined specifically, but “the so-called Generalklausel of Article 15 
gave Länder competence in all areas not explicitly mentioned in the constitution. Most Länder 
competences are determined through this residual clause (i.e., anything that is not specified as 
federal competence is Länder competence by default)” (Erk, 2004, 2). There can also be overlap 
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in the regulation of specific subjects as long as Federal and Länder address different aspects, 
such as the National Assembly legislating that there should be a social assistance system and 
Länder implementing specific regulations and requirements to access these funds (Gamper and 
Koch, 2014, 110). 
While the federal government might legislate laws, the Länder Governors and 
governments are responsible for executing and enforcing these laws (Gamper and Koch, 2014, 
104). This implementation power includes managing budgeting and spending, which lends itself 
to significant influence over actual outcome of federally legislated policies (Bussjäger, Schramek 
and Johler, 2018, 78). This system puts the Länd Governors in a unique and influential position.  
This sort of indirect administration makes the position of Governor highly consequential. 
It is the Governor who has final say in the issues of indirect federal administration (Karlhofer, 
2015, 65). Karlhofe (2015, 65) explains that the Governor is in a unique position between the 
federal government and the Länder governments:  
He/she alone is the central government’s counterpart, and thus responsible neither to the Landtag 
nor to his/her cabinet mates in the Land government. Since the Landtag’s autonomous legislative 
competencies are limited and with regard to the dominance of the executive headed by the 
government, the provincial parliament’s scope of influence is narrow, the more so as even its 
formal right of creating and controlling the government is considerably restricted in practice. Not 
only is the governor “government head, head of the bureaucracy, responsible agent for […] 
indirect federal administration”, and last but not least, in all external relations “head of state”. 
Moreover, any candidate for governor is usually leader of his respective party and therefore 
enjoys strong intra-party authority – as a result, Landtag elections are primarily governor 
elections.  
On the Land level, unlike the president, the executive office is extremely powerful. As a result 
the Land legislative bodies very rarely interact with the federal legislative bodies. Instead, the 
Land Governor, who is in charge of all external relations, is the main conduit through which the 
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Land government and federal government interacts. Governors are also generally the leaders of 
their respective parties in the Land. Usually Land level parties fall inline with national party 
guidelines, there is precedence of Land parties breaking away from national party guidelines in 
significant ways, such as un approved coalitions as will be discussed later. Governors bring their 
strong executive powers and party influence with them to the many conferences, where a large 
part of the informal negotiations and cooperation that are foundational to the Austrian system 
take place. 
Arguably, just as important to the Austrian system is the informal cooperation that gives 
Länder their most influence. Due to the Generalklausel, the Länder do have a menagerie of tools, 
such as concluding treaties, voluntary formal agreements and participating in joint conferences, 
in order to cooperate between themselves and the federal government (Gamper and Koch, 2014, 
104). Voluntary formal agreements, or concordats, are particularly frequent in the field of social 
welfare (Gamper and Koch, 2014, 112). The benefits of these informal tools for the Länder is 
clear. “The Länder prefer to enter into agreements with each other in order to achieve uniform 
standards throughout Austria rather than face the threat of a federal constitutional amendment, 
which would transfer one of their powers to the federal level” (Gamper and Koch, 2014, 111). 
Each Länder also has a liaison office that manages and facilitates coordination and cooperation 
(Gamper and Koch, 2014, 116). The exchange of information and relationship building that 
happens through these offices can be integral to policy making. 
There are a number of conferences and joint bodies in Austria where Länder officials, 
federal officials, municipality representatives and senior public servants meet, but the most 
important of the joint conferences is the Landeshauptmännerkonferenz (Conference of Land 
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Governors). While not expressly mentioned in Austria’s constitution, The Conference of Land 
Governors allows the Länder to compensate for the weak Bundesrat and represent Länder 
interests in federal policymaking (Bussjäger, 2018, 193). It is an informal and voluntary meeting, 
but “being a stronghold of Länder power that is much better able to defend Länder interests than 
the Federal Council, the Conference of Land Governors has been called ‘power in the 
shadow’” (Gamper and Koch, 2014, 117). It is particularly powerful in terms of negotiating the 
budgets and cost-sharing for the implementation of the federal laws (Bussjäger, Schramek and 
Johler, 2018, 96).  
These strengths of the Länder also lend themselves to subnational variation. As is 
constitutionally protected, Länder are able to enact their own legislation provided it does not 
conflict with federal regulations. On the administrative side, differing interpretations and 
budgeting strategies can result in differing policy outcomes. The same policies presented to 
different Länder can result in widely different applications of the law, especially when budgeting 
is concerned. This can be seen in the example of social assistance, where the Länder mandated 
benefit maximums and requirements can vary dramatically despite it being a federally mandated 
system. Additionally, the Länder can advocate for their specific interests in the joint conferences 
and meetings.  
2.2.Austrian Party System Overview 
For many years the Austrian party system was defined by its stability of its two Lager, or 
parties and associated organizations. The ÖVP, the conservative-Catholic “black” party, and the 
SPÖ, the left wing “red” party, were overwhelmingly dominant (Erk, 2004,6). As Erk explains, 
this divide dominated much of Austria’s political life. 
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“The red-black division became the defining political cleavage of the new Austrian state as the 
public sphere was divided between the two groups according to the system of proportionality 
(Proporz). All bureaucracies and public corporations, from their governing boards to the rank 
and file, were divided between the two Lager,” (Erk, 2004, 6). 
The black/red divide extended into all levels of political life, with trade unions, interest groups 
and professional associations all being aligned along the black/red cleavage. The depth of this 
divide also signified its stability over many decades. From 1947 to 1983 governing passed 
between the ÖVP and the SPÖ, unless they entered a coalition together (Erk, 2004, 7). 
Beginning in 1983 the FPÖ and eventually The Greens began garnering enough electoral 
success to participate in coalitions as junior partners (Erk, 2004, 7). This shift in the 1980s was 
slight with the SPÖ and ÖVP still maintaining the majority of the votes. Until the 1980's they 
achieved “continuously more than 90 percent of the votes, and the third largest party FPÖ 
ranging between five and seven percent” (Karlhofer, 2015, 66). Into the 90s however, the FPÖ, 
previously a social populist party now reinvented as a populist radical right party (PRRP) 
(Karlhofer, 2013, 46) and the Greens both experienced marginally more success. While they 
were not anywhere near able to overtake the SPÖ or the ÖVP, their success damaged the ability 
of the parties to cooperate or as Karlhofer (2013, 46) explains, “…a decline of the parties’ 
capacity to reconcile conflicting interests.” The truth of the matter is that the Greens and the 
FPÖ, while far from majority votes, became significant and could no longer be ignored.  
Even if more radical parties are not able to gain a majority vote and establish a 
government independently, they still have the power to radically influence the political 
landscape. One of the ways the FPÖ has been able to influence mainstream political parties is 
called the Overton Window. The Overton Window “…describes the spectrum of concepts, 
8
policies and approaches that can be publicly discussed without being ridiculed or 
marginalized” (Smith, 2019). There are only a certain number of potential policies that could be 
considered reasonable and probable by the political actors within any political situation and this 
is determined by a number of factors, such as past precedent, public opinion and each party’s 
political goals. When political actors deem policy options to be outside the Overton Window 
these options would have no hope of being discussed, let alone acted upon. However, when 
extreme parties, such as the FPÖ, publicly take on more radical ideas and have them legitimized 
through media coverage, debates and electoral success, they can shift the Overton Window. 
While the window may not shift far enough to include the specific policy ideas expressed by the 
extreme parties, it can substantially shift the potentially acceptable policy options further in that 
direction. In short, the electoral success of the FPÖ can force the SPÖ and the ÖVP to consider 
more right wing populist policy options than would have previously been possible.  
Scholars such as Mudde, Schumacher, and van Kersbergen, have also found evidence that 
successful populist parties can force an even more fundamental change in mainstream political 
competitors. Based on the assumption that at least part of a party’s motivation is vote and office 
seeking, it stands to reason that mainstream parties might adjust their platforms after seeing the 
success of a party such as the FPÖ, especially when this success comes at their own expense 
(Meguid, 2008). Schumacher and van Kersbergen (2014, 23) summarize this process succinctly, 
“…(1) Populists take a position that opposes the establishment; (2) from this position, populists 
enjoy electoral success; (3) mainstream parties accommodate populist parties by adjusting their 
policy positions away from their traditional stance.” Every party reacts uniquely to these 
pressures in terms of the policy choices that are shifted and the severity to which they are 
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changed, but it is easy to imagine why a party might adjust their platform in order to garner more 
votes.   
While it is easy to understand why mainstream political parties might shift their policy 
goals in an effort to garner more votes, the question remains: how did the FPÖ manage to get 
such a dramatic foothold in what was once an incredibly stable two party system? One potential 
answer points to an evolution of Lipset and Rokkan’s political cleavages theory. Lipset and 
Rokkan outline four major political cleavages that were thought to define political interests and 
conflicts: owner/worker, church/state, urban/rural and center/periphery (Lipset, 1976). In Austria, 
the SPÖ and ÖVP defined themselves through opposition on three of these issues: owner/worker, 
church/state and urban/rural (Aichholzer, 2014, 117).  
The SPÖ represented the working, secular and urban voters and the ÖVP took the 
opposing side, representing religious and rural voters that were often business owners 
(Aichholzer, 2014, 117). The FPÖ challenges this system by representing entirely new political 
conflicts in society. The party itself does not have a strong consistent stance on these traditional 
conflicts and instead focuses on defining their platform in regard to immigration, European 
integration, anti-elite sentiments and dissatisfaction with established systems (Rooduijin, 2013, 
32-33). Caiani and Císař point to impact of globalization as the source of these new conflicts “…
the new right-wing populist parties’ mobilization of the ‘losers’ in the processes of globalization 
is seen to be the driving force behind the restructuring of West European politics” (2019, 4). The 
positive response of Austrian voters to the FPÖ’s identity defined by these new conflicts clearly 
demonstrates that these issues are indeed salient in Austria and challenges how the SPÖ and ÖVP 
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have identified themselves for decades. As the SPÖ and ÖVP have not clearly defined 
themselves along these cleavages, the FPÖ’s success comes at their expense. 
Those that vote for the FPÖ have not completely abandoned the traditional cleavages, 
however. Many of these voters share characteristics with typical SPÖ voters, in that they are 
often low-skilled workers with lower educational attainment, urban and secular (Aichholzer, 
2014, 119). Since 1994 a core voter base for the FPÖ has been blue-collar workers, who are 
often found in urban centers as compared to the rural farming communities that are more often 
associated with supporting the ÖVP (Kritzinger, 2013 ,24). The common demographics of the 
FPÖ’s voter base may be due in part to the fact that these groups “are more likely to feel that 
they are modernization or globalization ‘losers’” (Aichholzer, 2014, 118) and therefore have 
more reason to feel discontented with the current establishment and opposition to the established 
government is a key FPÖ 
objective. This overlap 
between voter bases is 
significant because it 
suggests that Social 
Democrats may lose the 
most in regards to FPÖ 
competition (Aichholzer, 
2014, 131).  
 While SPÖ and FPÖ 
voters may share some 
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characteristics, both mainstream parties feel an electoral decline in response to the FPÖ’s 
success, as can be seen in Table 1. 
The biggest difference in individuals that vote for the FPÖ is that their primary motivations are 
not based on the traditional cleavages that define SPÖ/ÖVP competition. They are concerned 
with conflict areas of immigration, European integration and anti-establishment sentiments. 
Aicholzer summarizes this idea nicely by writing, "a new kind of political polarization has 
developed and provides the basis for the electoral success of the FPÖ and the associated electoral 
decline of the two mainstream parties” (2014, 131). This new kind of political polarization refers 
to the emergence of new cleavages, as discusses earlier and in addition to declining influence, it 
is likely that the FPÖ’s success will force the other parties to define themselves in regard to these 
new salient political dimensions, which would constitute a fundamental change to Austria’s once 
stable two party system.  
Without stability and with the addition of new parties it is more difficult for a single party 
to win enough votes to form a government on its own and enact policy changes. As is shown in 
Obinger’s (2002, 63) work, much of the policy changes possible in Austria are due to the fact 
that it has a “permissive constitution,” so that an elected party has significant power in passing 
reforms. Being forced into coalitions due to the votes being siphoned off by the FPÖ and the 
Greens changes this dynamic: “Policy stalemates are more likely to result from quarrels within a 
coalition government, since each coalition partner holds veto powers” (Obinger, 2006, 63). This 
creates a much more challenging environment in which to enact legislation. 
2.3.FPÖ History 
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The rise of PRRPs has been a hotly debated topic for several decades. While populism is 
a widely recognized word, defining populism and categorizing populist parties has been a 
challenge taken on by numerous scholars in many works. One of the major features of populist 
parties is their ability to shift and change according to the events and political climates of the 
time. In the past populist parties have been “…revolutionary, reactionary, left wing, right wing, 
authoritarian and libertarian” (Taggart, 2004, 275). Today, populism is mostly associated with the 
radical right (Mudde, 2004, 549). This ability to change and shift has made it difficult to pin 
down exact definitions and categorizations of populist parties and movements. Despite this 
challenge, there remains enough similarities to approach a definition and differentiate between 
other party families.  
One of the most widely accepted definitions comes from Taggart’s 2004 work, which 
outlines several themes that populist parties share. These themes are a hostility to representative 
politics, identification with a fictionalized ‘heartland’, opposition to the political elites, and being 
reactionary to a sense of extreme crisis (Taggart, 2004, 273-275). These themes are based on 
opposition and forming a distinctive identity based on in-groups and the ‘other’. Populist parties 
uphold a romanticized ideal of the country, what Taggart refers to as ‘the heartland’. Within this 
narrative the natives are the in-group and the others represent a threat to this ‘heartland’. This 
threat can come from outside, like immigrants, or from within as an oppositional party or ethnic 
minority that is corrupting the idealized country. These themes can be molded and shaped around 
any established governing party, cultural identity, or perceived threat. 
Mudde (2004, 543) likewise points to the defining feature of populist parties being 
focused on opposition: “I define populism as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately 
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separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt 
elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general 
will) of the people.” Again, this simple design featuring an in- and out-group, while unique and 
powerful, is easily adapted to the specific circumstances of a state at a specific time. Scholars 
point to the success of the PRRPS in general as a mobilization of the dissatisfaction felt by those 
left behind by globalization (Caiani, 2019, 15). These sentiments can be adapted based on a crisis 
at the time, such as the 2008 financial crisis, which manifested in Euro-skepticism in many 
parties, or the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’, which made immigration an incredibly salient topic across 
Europe and anti-immigration/anti-refugee popular amongst populist parties.  
The FPÖ has not always been a PRRP, however. The party is as old as the ÖVP and the 
SPÖ, but it has taken decades of evolution for it to land on successful platform. It began after 
WWII as a small relatively mainstream liberal party. In 1986, the party’s platform was staunchly 
anti-elite and from 1991 until 1996 the party was identified as social populist (Van Kessel, 2011, 
41). Social populism is defined by the combination of populism and socialism as the party’s core 
ideology (Mudde, 2007, 48). Social Populist parties still oppose the established system, but are 
aligned with egalitarian principles (Mudde, 2007, 48). It wasn’t until 1996 that it again 
transformed into the now recognizable radical right, anti-immigrant and anti-internationalist 
platform (Van Kessel, 2011, 41). 
A large part of the party’s success and growth has been credited to the former leader. Jörg 
Haider, who took over the party in 1986. He was known for his tight grip over the party, 
charisma and his dramatic style of rhetoric (Van Kessel, 2011, 42). Opponents to the FPÖ often 
condemned Haider’s comments, such as praising the Nazi party’s employment policies. But 
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despite his alleged racist sympathies, his success and the support of the Austrian voters could not 
be ignored (Taggart, 2004, 271). 
 Haider led the FPÖ into its current populist and anti-establishment position from his 
stronghold in Carinthia. Prior to Haider taking over, the FPÖ averaged 5-8 percent of the vote 
(Aichholzer, 2014, 114). Under his leadership the FPÖ achieved significant political success, 
especially in comparison to other PRRPs in western Europe. Since 1986 the party has averaged 
“around 15 per cent of the vote in national parliamentary elections and never falling below the 
9.7 per cent of 1986. It is also one of a small number of radical-right parties to have participated 
in government” (Aichholzer, 2014, 114). The FPÖ’s first peak in power came in the 1999 
election, with the party garnering 26.9 percent of the vote and participating in a coalition with the 
ÖVP (Van Kessel, 2011, 41). 
 The coalition entered into government in 2000. One might expect that this kind of 
coalition might signal a positive turning point for the FPÖ with it firmly seated as a major player 
in Austrian politics, but instead the coalition and the policies it passed resulted in a devastating 
decline in popularity. One of the most notable accomplishments of this coalition was reduction in 
welfare by extending the age of retirement (Afonso, 2014, 280). This welfare retrenchment 
largely affected blue collar workers, who are the FPÖ’s major supporters (Afonso, 2014, 280). 
As a result when the new elections were called in 2002, the FPÖ lost 34 of their parliamentary 
seats and witnessed large internal splits within the party that eventually led to the creation of the 
BZÖ, a right-wing party led by Haider, in 2005 (Afonso, 2014, 281). In addition to betraying 
their voters by enabling welfare retrenchment, the coalition also struck another blow to the 
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FPÖ’s credibility as an anti-establishment platform is difficult to maintain as part of a ruling 
coalition (Van Kessel, 2011, 42).  
 Following this coalition, the FPÖ received the lowest percentages of votes since 1986. In 
2002 and 2006 they were unable to garner more than 15 percent of the vote in parliamentary 
elections (Aichholzer, 2014, 117).  
These devastating election results contributed to an internal split within the party resulting in the 
formation of the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ). The BZÖ was lead by Jörg Haider, 
who developed a more moderate office-seeking platform (Heinisch, 2018, 1025). Heinz-
Christian Strache led what was left of the FPÖ. The BZÖ was moderately successful at the 
national level, but the majority of their strength was based on Haider’s leadership and the parties 
popularity in Carinthia (Heinisch, 2018, 1025). However, even this moderate success had 
national implications as the split weakened the FPÖ, the rival for the SPÖ and the ÖVP.  
 The event that had an even more significant impact on the national stage however, was 
the disintegration of the BZÖ. Haider died suddenly in a car accident in 2008. While the BZÖ’s 
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platform was more moderate than the FPÖ, the foundation of the party was its leadership rather 
than its platform (Heinisch, 2018, 1025). When Haider died the BZÖ fell apart and the majority 
of the BZÖ’s supporters returned to the FPÖ. Since then, the newly reunited FPÖ has again been 
garnering significant electoral success, largely at the expense of the SPÖ and ÖVP, breaking 
through 15 percent in 2009 (Heinisch, 2018, 1025). In 2017 after the parliamentary elections, the 
FPÖ again entered into a coalition with the ÖVP with 26 percent of the votes (IFES Election, 
2017). 
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CHAPTER THREE CASE SELECTION AND DATA
Austria was chosen for this thesis for two reasons. Firstly, the FPÖ is one of the most 
successful PRRP in Europe. Most European countries have instances of PRRPs arising, but often 
mainstream parties shun them and do their best to keep them from participating in Government. 
This was the case in Germany when the Alternative for Germany party was tabled extremist and 
placed under surveillance (Bennhold, 2020) and the Spanish Vox party was banned from a TV 
debate ahead of an election (Spanish, 2019). Whether thanks to the work of mainstream parties, 
or due to the independent choices of the voters, in many countries PRRPs have remained in the 
periphery. From 1980 to 2014 PRRPS have participated in government in only 12 countries and 
this participation was as a part of the majority government in only 9 of these countries 
(Abromeit, 2017, 301). In Austria however, the FPÖ has participated in the majority government 
from 2000-2002, 2002-2005 and after the 2017 elections. The FPÖ’s powerful presence in 
Austria lends itself well for exploring the impacts that PRRPS may have on social policies.  
Secondly, Austria’s party system was previously known for being a stable two party 
system. As was referenced earlier, the black/red divide was long held and permeated nearly 
every aspect of life. This stands at odds to more multi-party and tumultuous systems. With fewer 
parties, dynamics between them are more clearly identifiable. Additionally, the rise of the FPÖ in 
such a stable system is clearly a dramatic change, which begs investigation. 
The MMI is ideal for showcasing how the FPÖ has reshaped Austria’s social policy and 
the real impact this can have on specific reforms. Firstly, the timing of critical negotiation 
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periods for the reform coincide with elections. This is ideal as there is more information 
available. This reform also takes place across a period of substantial change in the FPÖ’s 
popularity, allowing for comparison. In 2010, the SPÖ was electorally successful and the FPÖ 
was  slowly rebounding from their slump in the early 2000’s, which captures the dynamics of the 
party system while the FPÖ is less influential. In 2015, the MMI must be renegotiated and this 
comes at a time where FPÖ popularity is reaching a new peak. In this way, MMI allows for a 
comparison on the same policy issue under two different levels of FPÖ influence. Additionally, 
the salience of the reform, given the FPÖ’s welfare chauvinist platform, ensures that information 
is available for analysis.  
3.1.Data 
 In order to test my hypothesis that the FPÖ, as a PRRP, has reshaped the post-war 
Austrian social policy through its electoral success and participation at the Federal and Länder 
level that has led to distinct shift in the Overton Window for the mainstream parties, I have 
largely relied on three sources: newspaper articles, party manifestos, and government programs 
and legislative documents. Much of my argument is focused on party attitudes towards welfare. 
These sources capture the public’s perspective, how the party wishes to be portrayed and actual 
commitment to legislation. Having this combination of perspectives can provide a more fulsome 
picture of a party’s real attitudes towards welfare. Tracing the party attitudes across elections 
from 2007 to 2019 also enables a clear demonstration of how Austria’s mainstream parties 
shifted their platforms in response to a changing political landscape.  
  Newspaper articles, particularly around the time of elections and new legislation, capture 
politicians’ and parties’ comments outside of official party documents. In order to obtain the 
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newspaper articles, I used the Proquest database and searched “Bedarfsorientierte 
Mindestsicherung,” the Austrian name for the MMI reform. I narrowed my search criteria to two 
specific time periods. The first was 2007-2010, the time within which negotiations and 
implementation of MMI occurred. The second time period was 2015-2017, which encompasses 
attempted renegotiations, the failure of MMI and relevant election periods.  
 I also utilized the Manifesto Project for my analysis. The Manifesto Project is a dataset 
covering “over 1000 parties from 1945 til today in over 50 countries on fire continents,” (About). 
In order to create this dataset, country experts read and annotate party manifestos based on policy 
preferences expressed in these documents. These annotations are used to calculate the number of 
times a manifesto makes reference to a specific policy preference. A higher score in a category 
indicates that a party manifesto more frequently mentioned a specific policy preference 
positively, so it could be inferred that it has a stronger preference towards this specific policy. 
For this analysis I used three variables: welfare, welfare state expansion and welfare state 
limitation.  
 Welfare state expansion variable is calculated by annotating each manifesto’s favorable 
mentions towards, “need to introduce, maintain or expand any public social service or social 
security scheme (2017, 18). Welfare state limitation is similarly calculated with the mentions of, 
“limiting state expenditures on social services or social security,” (2017, 18). Similarly, a higher 
score in this variable indicates a higher frequency of welfare state limitation being mentioned in 
a manifesto. The welfare variable is created by combining the welfare state expansion and 
welfare state limitation variables (2017, 30). This results in a variable that captures the overall 
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salience of welfare with a higher score indicating more mentions of welfare overall appearing in 
party manifestos.   
 Party manifestos and data from the Manifesto Project, indicate how the parties wish to be 
portrayed. I specifically searched party manifestos for opinions on welfare, social assistance and 
the MMI reform specifically. As with the newspaper articles, I focused my readings of party 
manifestos on elections taking place when MMI was being negotiated in 2007-2010 and when 
the agreement began to deteriorate in 2015-2017.  
 Government programs and legislative documents move beyond how the party wishes to 
be portrayed and into what policies the parties wish to and have the ability to enact. Government 
programs are released by the ruling government in Austria after elections when the new 
governments are formed and take power. They represent the government’s plans and intentions 
for its term. These programs also take into account Austria’s larger political landscape and 
coalitions. If there is a coalition, the programs are joint documents representing the negotiated 
stances agreed upon by the participating parties. As with my previous sources, I concentrated my 
research on the points in time where MMI experienced change:. firstly, when negotiations took 
place and the reform was implemented 2007-20010; and secondly, when the reform began to fall 
apart and eventually came to an end in 2015-2017. 
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CHAPTER FOUR MMI CASE STUDY
As was stated above, the MMI reform serves as a tool to illustrate how the FPÖ’s 
electoral successes and participation in government have caused the mainstream parties in 
Austria to shift towards welfare chauvinist policies. Social assistance, particularly it being 
available for non-natives Austrians is a salient issue for the FPÖ, making this a very relevant 
reform. Additionally, The process of the reforms negotiations, implementations, renegotiation 
and failure takes place during an FPÖ electoral slump in the early 2000's and then electoral 
success and return to power beginning in 2015, allowing for a clear view of the how the FPÖ’s 
resurgence and the mainstream parties response doomed this social assistance scheme. This 
section will be divided into three subsections. Firstly, I will describe the social assistance scheme 
and party positions on welfare prior to MMI, before 2008. Second, I will detail the MMI reform, 
FPÖ participation during these negotiations in 2008-2010 and corresponding party stances on 
welfare. The third section will detail the attempted renegotiations of MMI, the FPÖ’s resurgence 
due to the ‘Refugee Crisis” and the changed party stances towards welfare from 2015-2017. 
4.1.The Austrian System Prior to MMI 
The hypothesis of this thesis is based on how Austrian social policy has changed. In order to 
understand the magnitude and ramifications of change, it is helpful to first understand the system 
as it was originally. In this section, I will first describe the established system prior to 
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MMI being enacted. By system, I am referring both to the social assistance scheme in place, 
Sozialhilfe, and the established party preferences on welfare.  
4.1.1.Sozialhilfe System 
Austria, like Germany, has a Bismarkian welfare system, in which benefits are strongly 
tied to labor market participation and social assistance is generally seen as “a social safety net of 
the last resort based on subsidiarity and tied to a means-test” (Obinger, 2010, 101). Though 
social assistance in Austria is meant as a benefit of last resort after other benefits, such as 
unemployment insurance, have been exhausted, in reality it has been used to make up for the 
deficits the welfare system presents in other areas (Fink, 2009,11). These deficits may include 
scenarios such as, an individuals not being eligible for other benefits offered by the Austrian 
system or an individual exhausting the other benefits that they were eligible for while still 
needing assistance.  While social assistance is a competency area where Länder have maintained 
a considerable amount of power, there are a few country-wide consistencies in intention, 
provisions and basic eligibility when it comes to this benefit.  
As the system of last resort in Austria, individuals seeking access to social assistance 
must present a sincere need, as is judged by each Land. The fundamental idea of the program is 
to provide a basic level of subsistence for those who cannot provide for themselves. These needs 
are defined by the Austrian state as encompassing “housing, nourishment, clothing, personal 
hygiene, household goods, heating as well as goods necessary for social and cultural 
participation. This list is not exhaustive, as some social assistance acts mention further specific 
needs.” (Fink, 2009, 14). As a conditional cash transfer benefit, the Land calculates the amount 
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based on a rate determined by legislation, often influenced by the size of the household, and then 
provides a cash transfer to the individual. Some Länder also provide in-kind benefits.  
 The steps required to get this cash transfer are not always easy, however. Social 
Assistance is a means-tested benefit, which means an individual must show that they cannot 
provide for their own basic needs through their own means, the support of their family or 
through other available benefits (Fink, 2009,11). In addition, they must participate in trainings 
and programs intended to get them back into the labor market (Fink, 2009, 12). An additional 
challenge in Austria is that prior to 2010, each Länder had substantially different benefits and 
eligibility requirements.  
 Despite considerable pushes towards centralization, social assistance is an area that has 
stayed largely in the control of the Länder. As a whole the system can be incredibly confusing 
with remarkably low transparency, which makes it difficult for those eligible for social assistance 
to understand their rights and predict the outcomes of their applications (Fink, 2009,3). There is 
also significant variation between Länder both in terms of the eligibility requirements, benefits 
offered and the clients served (Heitzmann, 2010, 130). This variation stems from the 
fundamental design of Austria’s social assistance system as each of the nine Länder has the 
responsibility of delivering these benefits, so there are nine difference social assistance acts and 
each one has unique eligibility criteria, benefits, organizational structures and systems of 
financing, (Fink, 2009, 3). 
 Perhaps one of the most important areas of variation came in terms of residency 
requirements for eligibility. Overall, the regulations were be unclear and unpredictable between 
Länder and even between filing offices (Fink, 2009, 27). Overall, Austrian citizens had full 
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access to social assistance and EU/EEA citizens and privileged third-country nationals could 
access the benefits if they have obtained a residence permit (Fink, 2009, 13). Asylum seekers 
were generally supported through other benefits and other third-country nationals were able to 
access the benefit if they have been living in Austria legally for more than 5 years and had 
permanent full-time income during this period (Fink, 2009, 13). These restrictions on third-
country nationals are very interesting. While access is severely restricted for these individuals in 
most cases, the abuse of social assistance by non-Austrians is still a highly politicized topic. 
There have also been claims of some welfare offices refusing to process the applications of some 
benefit claimants, which is an illegal practice that often targets non-Austrians (Fink, 2009, 12) 
 In addition to citizenship, some Länder also have specific eligibility requirements in 
terms of residency. These requirements vary considerably across Länder. Carinthia, Burgenland, 
Lower Austria and Vorarlberg require a principle residence, but will make exceptions for those 
who have a “mere stay,” which is generally a residence where the beneficiary will be living for at 
least three months (Fink, 2009,13). Upper Austria, Salzburg, Styria, and Vienna only require a 
“mere stay” and Tyrol has no regulations regarding residency of this kind at all (Fink, 2009, 13). 
In order to be eligible for this benefit, individuals are often in the position of being unable to 
provide housing for themselves, so residency requirements can have a significant impact on 
individuals applying to receive social assistance.  
 Social assistance benefits are calculated based on reference rates. These rates were set 
individually and autonomously by each Land, which unsurprisingly again leads to considerable 
amounts of variation. These reference rates serve as maximum cash transfer amounts, which are 
reduced based on individual income and family resources and increased based on household size 
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(Fink, 2009, 14). Some Länder (Burgenland, Vienna and Upper Austria) also provide more 
resources based on other factors, such as individuals being incapacitated for work (Fink, 2009, 
14). The difference in benefits for a sole recipient varies as much as 274 Euros month in 2009 
(Fink, 2009, 27). Some of this difference is made up in additional transfers for heating and 
electricity costs (Fink, 2009, 16). 
 This 274 Euro difference a month is a substantial and impactful, especially when there 
are a number of inconsistent reasons that these numbers could be enlarged or reduced depending 
on the Länder. These reasons include marital status, age, and household arrangements (Fink, 
2009, 27). While the reasons themselves do not seem unfounded, the fact that they are 
inconsistent across these nine Länder paints a picture of a difficult and confusing system to 
navigate and to implement.  
 The fact that Austria’s social assistance system is flawed has been readily acknowledged 
by scholars such as Fink and politicians such as the SPÖ’s Gusenbauer, but the flaws identified 
have been based on perspective and political platform. In 2007, negotiations began regarding 
reforming social assistance. The SPÖ intended the reform to make such changes as creating 
uniform minimum standards, integrating social assistance recipients into standard health 
insurance, abolishing repayment of benefits and overall harmonizing the complex system 
between the nine Länder (Fink, 2009,20). 
4.1.2. Party Stances 
 The SPÖ has been the main force behind welfare expansion in Austria. It is generally pro-
welfare and pro-centralization, particularly in comparison to the other major parties. Utilizing the 
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Manifesto Project, we can see that the SPÖ generally had a higher score on the welfare variable 
than either the ÖVP or the FPÖ (Volkens, 2019).  
 Table 3 , displaying the Manifesto Project Welfare variable scores is useful for 1
characterizing, the 
general stance of 
the SPÖ. It can be 
seen that of the 21 
elections since 1949 
on which the 
Manifest Project has 
collected data, the 
SPÖ had a higher 
welfare score than 
both the ÖVP or the 
FPÖ in 16 elections 
(Volkens, 2019). It 
is notable that in 
2008, the 
beginnings of the 
MMI negotiations, the SPÖ’s welfare score increased from 19.695 to 22.3, which indicates a 
 This data is collected from official party manifestos regarding federal elections. This variable in 1




in their commitment 
to social 
expenditures. It is 
also notable that 
based on the 
Manifesto Project’s 
Welfare Limitation 
variable, the SPÖ’s 
score of 0.0 in 2008, indicates that the SPÖ did not mention welfare limitation a single time in 
their manifesto. 
 While the welfare variable clearly indicates the SPÖ’s commitment to social assistance, it 
is a general characterization. Looking into the manifestos themselves can provide a more specific 
insight into the SPÖ’s policy goals. For both 2006 and 2008, the SPÖ’s manifestos explicitly 
mentioned issues related to the MMI reform. For example, in 2006 the manifesto said that the 
SPÖ has three major concerns: sustainable poverty reduction, the integration of disabled 
individuals and the constantly growing need for these programs (Der Sozialdemokratischen, 
2006). It goes on to say that the SPÖ also wanted to make federal social welfare offices the main 
and only point of contact for those in need (Der Sozialdemokratischen, 2006). While this 2006 
manifesto did not refer to the reform by name it did demonstrate that the SPÖ was prioritizing 
issues that were directly in line with the reform itself. The main framing and selling point of the 
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MMI reform was poverty reduction, which was listed in 2006 as one of the three major concerns 
of the party.  
 In 2008, the SPÖ referenced issues on MMI reform in their manifesto. The SPÖ wrote 
that they had already done some work towards a needs-based secure minimum income, which 
was vital for poverty reduction and that this work must be continued (Der sozialdemokratischen 
Partei Österreichs, 2008). They continued by saying they wanted to reform unemployment 
insurance and social assistance in order to make the programs sustainable and these changes can 
be made by increasing minimum payments to above the poverty risk threshold (Der 
sozialdemokratischen Partei Österreichs, 2008). These goals of the MMI reform can be traced 
directly to the SPÖ’s manifestos. The SPÖ, while not the only architect, was certainly the driving 
force behind this reform, as it coincided with not only their general poverty reduction goals, but 
specific policy plans outlined in their election material. 
  Another crucial indicator of the party’s commitment to welfare expansion is their 
previous policy choices. For example, in the late 1990s as part of a Grand Coalition, the SPÖ 
pushed forward a reform “…to harmonize the calculation of civil servants’ pensions with that of 
general pensions (Obinger, 2010, 109). Largely, the SPÖ has also worked to counterbalance the 
ÖVP’s attempts to restrict the welfare state, preventing extensive retrenchment aimed reforms 
(Obinger, 2010, 113). 
 The ÖVP, the other mainstream part in Austria, has a mover conservative outlook on 
welfare. Returning to the Manifesto Project data, the ÖVP’s welfare scores were not widely 
different from those of the SPÖ. In fact, in five of the 21 elections (1949, 1966, 1970, 1979, 
2008) captured by the data from 1949 to 2017, the ÖVP has a slightly higher welfare score than 
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the SPÖ. While these comparisons certainly illustrate that the ÖVP was generally less supportive 
of expanding welfare than the SPÖ, to really understand the party’s perspective it is necessary to 
look at past policies championed by the party and the party’s own manifesto.  
 Many of the notable policy reforms from the ÖVP were centered around welfare 
retrenchment. In 1995 and 1996 the party supported the “Structural Adaptation Acts,” which 
amended 138 federal laws that led to “substantial cutbacks in social policy and public sector 
spending“ (Obinger, 2002, 55). In the 2000s, in a coalition with the FPÖ, the ÖVP passed further 
significant welfare reforms. The Pension Reform restricted eligibility for early retirement and 
limited widow’s and widower’s pensions (Obinger, 2002, 57). Further reforms also cut 
unemployment benefits, reduced eligibility for emergency funding and ended a federal grant for 
unemployment insurance (Obinger, 2002, 58). 
 As cutting welfare is rarely a popular platform, it makes sense that there was a difference 
between the ÖVP’s policies and their manifesto. However, in examining their manifesto it does 
provide significant insight. In 2006, top priorities included lowering taxes, pursuing active labor 
market policies and economic growth (Österreichische Volkspartei, 2006). Active about market 
policies are policies that are intended to help the unemployed and underemployed find work, 
such as job training and wage subsidies. The 2007 manifesto also suggested that the current state 
of the welfare system was enough by writing that Austria has the highest ratio of social spending 
in Europe at 29.4 percent or 9 billion Euros (Österreichische Volkspartei, 2006). While these 
statements were not expressly anti-welfare state or pro-retrenchment, they made clear that 
welfare state enlargement was not a top priority and that just maintaining the existing system was 
adequate.  
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 This idea of the welfare system already being adequate was mentioned for a second time 
in the 2006 manifesto. The ÖVP wrote that there had already been welfare expansion in the past 
four years in order to cover vulnerable individuals and due to this expansion. The manifesto 
stated, “The increase in the minimum pension for single people that we have undertaken is an 
effective protection against poverty in old age” (Österreichische Volkspartei, 2006). This again 
reiterates, that while the ÖVP is not outright against social assistance, they are against welfare 
expansion.  
 Another interesting insight from the 2006 and 2008 manifestos is that in all of the 
instances supporting welfare, there is also a distinct overlay of discerning between those that 
deserve and those that do not deserve welfare. In the majority of the occasions that welfare is 
mentioned it is in reference to vulnerable populations, such as children, mothers, the elderly, the 
sick and those with disabilities (Österreichische Volkspartei, 2006) and (Österreichische 
Volkspartei, 2008). Rather than supporting welfare generally, the ÖVP supported maintaining the 
current level for the truly vulnerable in society, which was low compared to other European 
countries. 
 The FPÖ’s stance on welfare was substantially different from that of the other two 
parties, due in large part to the fact that populist parties adapt and change rather quickly and that 
the FPÖ’s major party platform was based on new cleavages. Looking at their welfare score on 
the Manifesto Project, it has fluctuated dramatically from 1990 to 2017 from a high of 24 to a 
low of 2.9, the lowest score presented in 1990 (Volkens, 2019). In 2006 and in 2008 the scores 
were 11.692 and 17.965 (Volkens, 2019). These were the lowest scores of the three parties in 
both years.  
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 In the 2000s when the FPÖ and the ÖVP entered into a coalition, the main policy reforms 
were centered on welfare retrenchment. As was discussed in the previous section, there were 
further reforms reducing unemployment insurance and ultimately these policies, which undercut 
the FPÖ’s blue collar base, the pressure due to the reduction that came as a result of the 
unpopular reforms and infighting resulted in the end of the coalition and the splintering of the 
party. This tumultuous period and poor reception for the reforms may have influenced the FPÖ’s 
future stances on welfare, potentially pushing them towards stances more supportive of welfare 
expansion.  
 The FPÖ’s manifesto for the years 2006 and 2008 makes its position clearer. The party it 
promoted welfare chauvinism. In 2006, the party wrote that there should be a separate security 
system for foreigners coming to work in Austria and that there should be no policies to support 
foreign in workers coming to Austria to serve as nursing staff (Der Freiheitlichen Partei 
Österreichs, 2006). Notably, the manifesto also walks back the disastrous pension policies of the 
previous coalition, saying there should be no further increase in the retirement age “because the 
labour market is not equipped for it” (Der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs, 2006). Rather than 
supporting welfare enlargement, the party was playing on anti-immigrant sentiments and trying 
to undo the damage of the previous years.  
 In 2008, the welfare chauvinist position becomes even more defined. The FPÖ writes 
specifically of the importance of returning foreigners that abuse the social assistance system, 
have no jobs and have no decent housing (Der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs, 2008). The 
Manifesto Project score refers to broad policy preferences, but it not built to capture the 
intricacies of the party’s platform. Additionally, the fact that the FPÖ has only participated as a 
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coalition member in government once, in the early 2000’s, makes it difficult to evaluate the party 
based on their past policies. The key to analyzing the FPÖ lies in their manifesto, which clearly 
supports a welfare chauvinist platform after 2002.  
4.2.MMI Enacted 
The flaws of Austria’s Sozialhilfe System have been a topic of debate for decades, largely 
brought up by the SPÖ. Some of the major complaints being that it is a confusing and inefficient 
system that does not actually protect those in need from poverty. Fink (2009, 29) wrote, “The 
current regime of social assistance appears to provide benefits that are considerably lower than 
the risk-at-poverty threshold,”. Despite these long standing complaints, reforming this system 
was not an easy task. The FPÖ and the ÖVP utilized arguments of welfare chauvinism, 
accusations of welfare abuse and claims that the current system was sufficient in order to curtail 
efforts on welfare expansion. There were also considerable arguments on the Länder level, 
particularly from Länder with right-wing governments, such as Carinthia, that federal reform 
would lead to the imposition of additional costs on Länder. In this section I will first outline the 
MMI agreement as it came into force in 2010. Secondly, I will detail the political landscape and 
party preferences that made this reform possible on the federal and Länder level. This will 
illustrate that the reduction in the FPÖ’s influence allowed for a welfare expansionist reform, 
framed as a poverty reducing tool of all of Austria, to be enacted.  
4.2.1.MMI Outline 
Negotiations began in 2007, and an agreement was reached in 2009, but the new policies 
regarding the MMI scheme came into force in 2010 (Fink, 2009, 20). The agreement was an 
interesting melding of federal and Länder policies. Prior to harmonization each Länder had a set 
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of provisions controlling social assistance. The new reform overlaid these already established 
specific policies, rather than creating an entirely new national framework. It did this by setting 
national minimums and standards, but still allowed the Länder to legislate details beyond what 
was specified in the reform (Fink, 2016, 1). Critics of the reform argued that the centralization 
and harmonization aspect of the MMI reform was not accomplished as benefit levels still varied 
amongst Länder, but a nationwide minimum was established. Legally, it was a series of 
agreements between the Federal Republic of Austria and the Länder rather than strictly national 
legislation (Fink, 2009, 20).  
 Fundamentally, the reforms focused on harmonizing and raising benefits available in each 
Länder to reduce poverty levels in Austria. As explained by Leibetseder (2015, 63), 
“ The national framework introduced a minimum basic rate of €752.94 (2011), including 
25 per cent for housing costs. In households with more than one adult, each adult 
counted for 75 per cent and each child added 50 per cent to the basic rate towards the 
household benefit. The provinces were not permitted to undercut the threshold and 
were asked to provide higher housing support in case of need (Art 15a Vereinbarung). 
Implementing the new framework, the provinces sought to combine their previous 
schemes with the new guidelines. Due to miscellaneous mismatches, the benefit level 
varied between the national minimum of €753 and €1,000 for a single person, and 
between €1,140 and €2,040 for a couple with two children, including housing benefits.”  
These rates, which were comparable to those offered under Austrian old age insurance, were 
intended to cover all subsistence costs. While intended to including housing, for Länder where 
housing would cost more than 25 percent of the benefit, such as Vienna, there was an additional 
benefit that could compensate for this expense (Fink, 2009, 19). 
 In addition to minimum income, this reform instituted a number of other benefits for 
those at risk of poverty. First, accessing social assistance was supposed to be made easier as any 
job center or welfare office would be able to file a claim (Leibetseder, 2015,62). Second, those 
34
that utilized social assistance would also have access to the active labor market policies, such as 
retraining, through the Austrian Employment Service, which was previously only available for 
those on unemployment assistance (Fink, 2009, 20). This element was an important change, as 
unemployment insurance had a time limit and many reliant on social assistance were facing long 
term unemployment. Third, recipients were integrated into standard health insurance (Fink, 2009, 
19).  
 Another significant change made in this reform was in sanctions or repayments of 
benefits. The new reforms made it much more difficult for Länder to end, penalize or force 
payback on received benefits. Previously, Länder were able to force social assistance recipients 
to payback benefits for various reasons, depending on Land policy, such as future income from 
employment (Fink 2009, 20).Under the new reform, “nearly all forms of refunding / repayment 
of benefits by former benefit recipients would be abolished” (Fink, 2009, 20). Sanctions were 
also severely curtailed. “Sanctions are now allowed only gradually, with written warning to be 
issued first; the recipient is then accorded sufficient time to eliminate his/her shortcoming 
concerning job search” (Leibetseder, 2015, 65). Additionally, exceptional circumstances had to 
be proven for cuts over 50 percent. 
 While this reform did not result in perfect harmonization of policies, it did make a more 
navigable and generous system. For the majority of the Länder, this minimum did represent an 
increase in benefits. A small number of Länder offered higher benefits prior to the reform, but 
generally these were maximums that were reduced based on factors such as assets and calculated 
family support at the discretion of the Länder, municipality and even the case worker. Rather 
than basing the system on maximum payments at the discretion of local actors, this new 
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agreement provided an easily accessible system with relatively predictable and protected benefit 
rates.  
 The increased generosity and accessibility of the benefit was expected to bring a likewise 
increased price tag by most Länder. Overall, eight of the nine Länder (only Vorarlberg was an 
exception) increased their spending on cash benefits and increased in number of recipients from 
2010 to 2012 (Leibetseder, 2015, 61). However, for Länder these increases did not clearly 
indicate an overall increase in welfare expenditure. Leibetseder ( 2015, 61) explains, 
“First, all previously uninsured recipients are now included in the health insurance scheme, 
whereby the federal state covers any additional spending. Second, unemployment (assistance) 
benefits were raised, thus lowering the costs for topping-up payments in the provincial social 
assistance scheme as well. Only Vienna, Burgenland and Tyrol experienced higher budgetary 
costs per capita due to the transition.” 
Of course, there were also unaccounted for costs associated with bringing all of the Länder into 
compliance, with issues such as preparing staff, and these costs could not be recuperated with the 
abolishment of benefit repayment. However, this quote illustrates that in the deeply interwoven 
system of federal and Länder competencies and budgets, it is difficult to cleanly say who had 
won or lost financially at the budgetary level.  
 Additionally, the consequences were not identical even between Länder, as can be 
observed in Table 5.  The difference in the number of recipients between each Länder and even 
the proportion of recipients in total population was significant, with Vienna accounting for over 
one-half of the recipients for all of Austria with the next highest Land accounting for only eight 
percent of the population. In 2012, as this is when data is available, in Styria, the Land with the 
2nd highest number of recipients, there were 19,552 receiving social assistance (Leibetseder, 
2015, 60). In 2012, in Salzburg, the Land with the second highest proportion of recipients in the 
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total population, 2.09 percent of people were receiving social assistance benefits (Leibetseder, 
2015, 60). However, in Vienna in 2012, which had the highest number in both categories, 6.28 
percent of people or 126,520 individuals were receiving social assistance (Leibetseder, 2015, 
60). Meanwhile, in 2012 in Burgenland, 3,023 individuals received social assistance benefits 
(Leibetseder, 2015, 60). These numbers clearly show that there is still a significant difference 
between Länder, though for most the benefit rate increased. 
4.2.2. Federal Level Negotiations 
 Reforming Austria’s social assistance scheme had been a topic of debate for years, but 
enacting the reform was possible because the FPÖ fell into an electoral slump after the early 
2000’s. As a result of the 1999 election, the FPÖ entered into a governing coalition with the 
ÖVP, which was a tremendous achievement for the PRRP. This coalition ended disastrously for 
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the FPÖ. Tensions within the party resulted in the splitting of the party and the formation of the 
BZÖ in 2005 and in the 2006 election it became clear that the welfare retrenchment policies that 
were passed were deeply unpopular with the FPÖ’s voter base.  
 Notably, in 2004 the SPÖ’s presidential candidate, Heinz Fischer, was elected with 52.4 
percent of the vote (Turner, 2008, 156). The president is a largely symbolic position in Austria, 
but this election is notable because it is highly publicized and participated in by Austrian voters. 
If nothing else it served as a measure of Austrian public opinion on the parties ahead of the 
legislative elections. Based on the 2004 presidential election results, voters were favoring the 
SPÖ and this popularity continued into 2006, as can be observed in Table 6. 
 This popularity for the SPÖ began to wane in the national parliamentary election in 2006, 
where the SPÖ won 35.7 percent of the vote and 68 seats in the Austrian parliament, a narrow 
win over the ÖVP, which won 66 seats with 34.2 percent of the vote (Turner, 2008, 156). 
Despite the overall drop in votes, the SPÖ retained the important position of having the most 
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seats in the NationalRat.Obviously, with only 35.7 percent of the vote the SPÖ was unable to 
form a government independently; a coalition was necessary. The preferred coalition partner 
would have been the Greens, but these two parties cooperating would still not provide the 
majority needed to form a government (Twist, 2019, 70). Additionally, the SPÖ refused to form a 
coalition with the FPÖ, so the only possible coalition partner to form a government was the ÖVP 
(Twist, 2019, 70). The ÖVP, was not excited about the prospect, but through negotiations and the 
President of Austria refusing to call a new election, the coalition was formed between the ÖVP 
and the SPÖ and the Grand Coalition returned (Twist, 2019, 71). As a result of these elections, 
the SPÖ returned to governing for the first time since 1999 (Viola, 2018, 382). 
 While both the wins for the presidential and in parliamentary elections occurred at a 
narrow margin, it was still a significant development. First, the SPÖ held the President of Austria 
and was leading the coalition in the ruling government, not an insignificant amount of power 
when trying to negotiate and pass reforms. Second, the FPÖ was less successful, making more 
space for the ÖVP and the SPÖ, the two major mainstream parties, to again cooperate. With this 
coalition the government controlled 73.2 percent of the seats in the Austrian Parliament, which is 
more than enough to enact legislation (Twist, 2019, 70).  
 However, in 2008 this grand coalition came to an end, due in part to the influence of the 
Länder Governors. Unsurprisingly, the ÖVP and the SPÖ had a contentious relationship. The 
SPÖ Chancellor, Alfred Gusenbaur, made some major and unpopular concessions to the ÖVP 
and these negotiations meant his party could not achieve key campaign promises. As a result of 
the conflict within the coalition and the SPÖ’s perceived lack of progress, Chancellor Gusenbaur 
was removed as the party leader (Twist, 2019, 73). SPÖ provincial leaders feared his 
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unpopularity would hurt them in subnational elections, and losses between 25 percent and 40 
percent at state elections (relative to their previous totals) in 2008 increased pressure for his 
removal” (Twist, 2019, 73). 
Gusenbaur’s removal and the disintegration of the coalition resulted in a snap election in 
2008 . During this election, the FPÖ and the BZÖ both saw a slight resurgence at the expense of 2
the SPÖ and the ÖVP. The SPÖ managed 57 seats with 29.3 percent of the vote and the ÖVP had 
51 seats with 26 percent of the vote (Turner, 2009, 154). Despite this poorer showing, the SPÖ 
maintained its slight advantage and the presidency and the arithmetic of coalition forming 
remained broadly unchanged. The SPÖ and the ÖVP again formed a grand coalition controlling 
59 percent of the seats in parliament (Twist, 2019, 72).  
The prospect of the SPÖ and the ÖVP cooperating still seemed a challenge.  
Thus, the unhappy marriage between the SPÖ and ÖVP was to continue. The ÖVP did not 
support SPÖ’s proposals to recognize same-sex partnerships, introduce a minimum income level, 
and change the tax structure so that women were provided fewer incentives to stay at home. Yet 
both major parties were able to achieve their primary goal of governing and could blame the 
other for the coalition’s ineffectiveness (Twist, 2019, 73). 
Despite these initial misgivings, it is notable that even after a failed government at the end of the 
previous coalition, the SPÖ was still in a privileged position as the coalition leader with the 
Chancellors position and 6 more seats than the ÖVP. Additionally, the FPÖ’s position as only the 
third most popular party and being in opposition, rather than participating in government eased 
pressures to shift the Overton Window towards the right and provided more space for 
cooperation and negotiation than previously available in the early 2000s. This change in power, 
 Tables detailing election cycles can be found in the Appendix2
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in conjunction with the pressure on the SPÖ to deliver on campaign promises after a the 
previously failed government, spurred on more coordination than initially expected. 
4.2.3. Länder Level Negotiations 
 While the national parties may have found a compromise, agreement did not necessarily 
hold true for the parties on the Land levels. Land governors are important political figures in 
their own right and in order for a reform based on voluntary cooperation to pass, all of the 
Länder must be satisfied by the policy. This portion of negotiations required several rounds and 
adjustments over the years, largely taking place in the informal conferences that are integral to 
Austrian federalism. There were three Länder that stood out as particularly difficult to please 
during negotiations: Lower Austria, Vorarlberg and Carinthia. 
 Lower Austria and Vorarlberg shared some similarities in their disagreements with the 
SPÖ-proposed MMI reform. The main issue that these two Länder had with the reform was with 
the “one-stop-shop” idea. This piece of the reform proposed that the Austrian Employment 
Services (AMS) was responsible for all of the information and services that individuals using this 
benefit would need in order to streamline the previously confusing process (Heigl, 2008). A 
Lower Austria’s Land Official claimed that this “one-stop-shop” idea was dishonest because 
individuals would still need to interact with Land and municipal authorities in order to access 
additional benefits (Ettinger, 2008). Ultimately, a compromised was reached where the AMS 
would be responsible for submitting, pre-examining, and forwarding applications to respective 
district head offices if specific Länder choose to opt in to this approach rather than having the 
AMS manage the entire process (Heigl, 2008). Vorarlberg proposed this compromise and Lower 
Austria agreed (Heigl, 2008). 
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 A potential reason for Vorarlberg and Lower Austria to take issue with the AMS being a 
one-stop-shop was that it reduced the administrative influence that the Länder would have on the 
outcomes of these welfare systems. One of the major powers of the Länder was their ability to 
administer and enact federal legislation. By having a federal service take over the entire process 
of administering this social assistance, the Länder’s power in this field would greatly reduce.   
Another important consideration was that both of these Länder were governed by ÖVP 
members . Being ÖVP party members, the leaders of these Länder may have opposed the 3
welfare expansionist reforms, but they are not immune to federal politics. The grand coalition on 
the federal level pushed the national ÖVP politicians to reach a compromise with the SPÖ in 
order to participate in and form a government, the Land politicians operated under similar 
pressures. They likely faced pressure from national party leaders to follow the party line, which 
had already compromised on the reform. However, Governors are not entirely bound by the wills 
of the national parties and face local pressures to advocate for their constituents, so they may still 
push for concessions. 
 Carinthia also caused significant difficulties in negotiations. Carinthia is a unique Land in 
Austria as it has been the stable seat of power for the PRRPs, generally the FPÖ, but also briefly 
the BZÖ. Carinthia continually refused to give its consent to this reform (Fink and Bettina, 2019, 
29). The PRRP led government objected to the reform for two reasons. First, they wanted to be 
exempted as their social assistance rates were already above the reforms quoted national 
minimum (Fink and Bettina, 2019, 29).However, it is important to note that Carinthia’s rate was 
a maximum, so it could be understood that many individuals using the benefit may have actually 
 Länder Election detailed in Appendix3
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received less than what the proposed national minimum. A second major complaint was that 
there were no clear guidelines on how many non-EU citizens could access the benefit. Carinthia 
imposed a strict guideline of only 30 percent of non-EU citizens having access (Wiesauer, 2009). 
 It is unsurprising that the Länder housing the PRRPs would have such a strong stance 
against non-EU citizens having access to social assistance, which aligns with their welfare 
chauvinist tendencies. What is extremely interesting is that through the political power of the 
Land/Governor, a party with very few parliamentary seats and very little influence on the 
national level was able to effectively halt a national reform. After significant federal pressure and 
public criticism from both the SPÖ and NGO’s, Carinthia eventually relented in its refusal (Fink 
and Bettina, 2019, 29). 
 Other Länder, such as Styria and Upper Austria, also opposed the reform at points in the 
negotiation process, but they did not have longstanding issues. One reason that some states 
opposed the reform for a portion of the negotiations was regional elections.  The Länder have 4
elections at different times  and for those with ÖVP and FPÖ candidates it made sense to stick 5
with the original party platform of being against welfare enlargement and opposing whatever the 
SPÖ government was proposing. The pressures of an impending election encouraging 
conservative candidates to oppose the MMI reform was certainly the case for Upper Austria and 
Carinthia, at least in part (Oswald, 2008). However, as these disagreements were based in 
election campaigns, in the span of these negotiations the campaigns were relatively short lived. 
Once elected, politicians faced the same pressures as their predecessors to cooperate.  
 Regional election results for relevant Länder detailed in Appendix4
 Election cycles detailed in Appendix5
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 The negotiations ended in 2009 and the MMI reform came into for in 2010. However, the 
agreement that came into force is very different from the initial goals proposed by the SPÖ. The 
negotiation process clearly showed the important roles of Länder in the Austrian system. It is 
also hard to imagine the reform ever being passed if the FPÖ/BZÖ had more influence. Reduced 
to a few seats in the Austrian Parliament and dominance in a single Länder, the radical right 
populists were still able to cause significant difficulties in passing this reform.  
4.3.Post MMI 
 The initial MMI agreement was temporary from the outset. It came into force in 2010 and 
was scheduled to be renegotiated, but when the Federal and Länder governments were unable to 
reach a suitable compromise the reform expired in 2016 (Fink, 2017, 1). This expiration meant 
that social assistance would once again be under the complete purview of the individual Länder. 
While managing the initial negotiation was difficult, it ultimately created a relatively successful 
reform in that is met the SPÖ’s goals of expanding benefits and making it easier to access these 
benefits, so the question to be answered is what changed? In this section I will show that the 
FPÖ’s electoral resurgence, due to the Refugee Crisis, shifted the Overton Window of the 
mainstream parties towards more welfare chauvinist platforms, which made renegotiating MMI 
impossible. In order to do this I will first outline the impact of the Refugee Crisis on Austria. I 
will then detail the FPÖ’s electoral rebound on the federal and Länder level. Lastly, I will detail 
the rightward shifting platforms of the SPÖ and the ÖVP, that doomed MMI.  
4.3.1.Refugee Crisis 
 The 2015 Refugee Crisis is an integral part of this story as it fueled the the FPÖ’s revival. 
In 2015, waves of refugees came to Europe’s shores in unprecedented numbers, fueled by the 
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conflict in Syria. The issue of migration and refugees became highly politicized and 
controversial in most of the EU member states. The politicization of immigration held true in 
Austria as well, with the country receiving criticism from the EU for failing to meet their refugee 
quota (Ruadhan, 2017) and renegotiating their border policies after 20 years of open borders 
(Dell’Orto and Wetzstein, 2019, 40). This crisis also gave a convenient and powerful foothold to 
the FPÖ, which already had an anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim platform. 
 The “Refugee Crisis”, as it became known, began in 2015. Facing increased violence and 
persecution in their home countries, large numbers of people from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq 
began perilous journeys across the Mediterranean through Libya to Italy or from Turkey into the 
Greek Islands (Spindler, 2015). The sheer numbers of people arriving at Europe’s shores kept the 
crisis in the news cycle for months, by December 911,000 refugees and migrants in Europe 
(Spindler, 2015). During the crisis there were two dominant narratives in the media. Firstly, 
many news sources focused on the peril and danger that the refugees and migrants encountered 
at home and on their journey to Europe. Though 911,000 refugees and migrants reached Europe 
by December of 2015, 3,550 also lost their lives (Spindler, 2015). The other dominating 
narrative, painted these migrants as either burdens for the state or dangerous.  
 In Austria, the Refugee Crisis played a significant role in the political landscape from 
2015-2017. While Italy and Greece faced the challenge of the majority of the arrivals, many did 
not remain in where they initially entered the EU. Austria was one of the top destination 
countries in the EU in 2015.  
 As can be seen in Figure 1, Austria was one of the top eight receiving countries in the 
EU. In fact, it was fourth in 2015 with 88,160 asylum seekers with a population of 8,576,261 
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(Asylum Application, 2018). Germany, the most prolific receiver had 476, 510 asylum seekers in 
2015 with a population of 81,197,537 (Asylum Application, 2018). As defined in this data set, 
asylum seekers are “people who make a formal request for asylum in another country because 
they fear their life is at risk in their home country,” (Asylum Application, 2018).  
 Looking at the data 
in Figure 2 illustrates that 
Austria took in a large 
number asylum seekers, but 
it paints an incomplete 
picture. Refugees or, 
“people fleeing their home 
country to save their lives 
and who have been 
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accepted and recognized as such in their host country” (Asylum Application, 2018), also 
represent a large number of individuals coming into Austria, with a significant increase 
beginning around the same period.  
 The Refugee Crisis began in 2015, but it did not end there as it is a complex and 
persistent issue. As can be seen in Table XX, Austria saw a spike of asylum seekers in 2015 that 
declined relatively quickly. The number of refugees, however, continued to climb through 2017. 
This characterizes the persistent nature of the Refugee Crisis. Taken in terms of Austrian politics, 
the lasting impact go the crisis has allowed the then 2 year old crisis to remain a salient issue in 
the 2017 federal elections.  
 The refugee crisis made immigration and the outsider focused rhetoric of the radical right 
populist movement salient in a way that it had not been for decades in Austrian politics. 
Austrians were afraid of an influx of strangers challenging the resources of the state. The FPÖ 
took this fear, added a layer of Islamic-phobia, magnified it and turned it into electoral successes 
that dramatically reshaped the political landscape in Austria. This is not to say that the refugee 
crisis was solely responsible for the FPÖ’s success. In prior elections the party was successful 
enough in 2013 to win seats and parliament and participate in Länder governments, but the 
refugee crisis provided a perfect opportunity to push the Party into a far better position than they 
had previously held. 
4.3.2. The FPÖ’s Electoral Rebound 
4.3.2.1.Federal 
 Conveniently for the FPÖ, the European Refugee Crisis came on the eve of a series of 
elections. The salience of the immigration issue propelled the FPÖ into stunning electoral 
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successes in Länder, Presidential and Parliamentary elections from 2015 to 2017. The FPÖ had 
already experienced some increase in electoral success beginning in 2010, but the 2015 Länder 
election and 2016 presidential elections cemented their resurgence and active role in governance 
(Smale, 2015). 
 In 2016, Austria held a presidential election. As previously detailed, the position itself is 
largely symbolic, but the election is notable as a measure of public opinion. The 2016 campaign 
was a dramatic and closely followed by many people around the world due to the very strong 
likelihood that Austria would elect a populist right wing president. Interestingly, neither the SPÖ 
nor the ÖVP, traditionally the two main parties from which all president have come, put forward 
a successful candidate. Instead, the two most successful candidates came from the Greens, Van 
der Bellen, and the FPÖ, Norbert Hofer. The SPÖ and the ÖVP candidates were knocked out of 
the race in the first round (Smale, 2016). These results clearly demonstrated a pervasive 
dissatisfaction with the traditional parties (Murphy, 2016).  
 From the outset the 2016 presidential election was a stunning turn of events as it mounted 
a serious challenge, a PRRP candidate has never done so well in a presidential election in Austria 
before. The last few months of the presidential race became even more dramatic when, in an 
unprecedented move, the initial results of the election had to be thrown out and the election 
redone. "Austria’s highest court has overturned the results of presidential election, citing 
procedural irregularities and ordered a rerun to be held in September or October, an 
unprecedented decision in the country's post-war history.” (Cocoli, 2016). Following this 
decision, in the second lead up to the election many opinion polls predicted an FPÖ victory 
(Smale, 2016). 
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 The race was decided by a razor’s edge: “The Interior Ministry count gave van der 
Bellen, a former Green party leader, 50.3 percent of the vote, compared to 49.7 percent for Hofer. 
The margin of victory was just over 31,000 out of nearly 4.5 million valid votes cast” (Murphy, 
2016). Many moderates and left-wing politicians painted the defeat of the FPÖ as a defining 
rebuke of the PRRP by the people of Austria, but this analysis ignores the important fact that the 
FPÖ had the best showing they have ever had in a presidential election and very nearly won.  
 Just a year later, in 2017, Austria held an election for the National Parliament. These snap 
elections were the result of the failing of the 2013 coalition between the SPÖ and the ÖVP.  
“The coalition government that followed the 2013 election was a forced marriage between the 
two main parties driven mainly by the absence of a viable alternative. Yet the considerable 
ideological differences between the SPÖ and ÖVP, ‘in particular regarding pensions, education 
and taxes’, made the government compromise reached after the 2013 elections a very feeble one” 
(Bodlos, 2017, 1354). 
The tense 2013 coalition was not able to withstand the added pressures of economic stagnation, 
the Refugee Crisis and the distrust that these disagreements bred (Bodlos, 2017, 1355). After the 
presidential election, which was disastrous for both parties, the SPÖ and the ÖVP party heads 
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resigned. As a result of the coalition’s failure, the government dissolved and snap-elections were 
held in 2017.  
 The results of the elections placed Austria on a decidedly rightward path. The ÖVP 
secured the most votes with 31.50 percent (62 seats), the SPÖ gained only 26.9 percent (52 seats) 
and the FPÖ captured 26.0 percent (51 seats) (IFES, 2017). The ÖVP and the FPÖ negotiated a 
coalition to form a government, marking the first time since 2002 that the FPÖ had been in 
government. These were not easy negotiations, as they lasted for two months; but they resulted 
in the FPÖ being allocated key portfolios, such as Interior, Defense, and Foreign Affairs (Bodlos, 
2015, 1360). It is important to note that the government program released by the coalition cited 
tightening regulations on immigration and reducing welfare benefits, particularly for refugees, as 
policy goals. These goals are directly inline with the FPÖ’s welfare chauvinist ideals and with 
the new coalition the ÖVP no longer faced the pressures to cooperate on welfare expansion, 
namely the MMI reform, from the SPÖ.  
 While it was highly unlikely that the SPÖ and the ÖVP would form another coalition, it is 
notable that the SPÖ announced that it would consider a coalition with the FPÖ, which is a 
complete reversal on previous party principles that opposed and isolated the FPÖ (Bodlos, 2017 
1360). The willingness of both mainstream parties to form a coalition with the FPÖ in order to 
gain office illustrated a definite willingness to accommodate the FPÖ in response to the party’s 
electoral success. Furthermore, this shift was not met with the same outrage and concern from 
the rest of the world as it was after the 1999 elections, “the first government formation process 
between the ÖVP and FPÖ in 2000 had caused severe national and international protest and even 
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diplomatic sanctions by other member states of the European Union. In contrast, the negotiation 
process and inauguration in 2017 were accompanied by little critique from European or 
international leaders and less national protest,“ (Bodlos, 2017 1361). 
There was of course still concern from many European leaders that a radical right wing populist, 
euro-skeptic party being in Government in Austria, but at least on some level their success was 
accepted and expected more than in 2002.  
4.3.2.2. Länd 
 The FPÖ also saw a strong resurgence on the Länder stage after the Refugee Crisis. 
Land elections are important on two accounts. First, they serve as an indication for national 
political opinion and a potential predictor for national elections (Karlhofer, 2013, 46). Second, as 
was demonstrated by Carinthia, Lower Austria and Vorarlberg during the original negotiations of 
the MMI reform, even a single dissenting Länder can prevent negotiations from moving forward 
due to the power of the Governors. While the FPÖ is pro-welfare for Austrians, the MMI allowed 
for non-EU citizens to access the benefit, prompting the FPÖ to oppose it. In 2015, Upper 
Austria, Styria, Burgenland, and Vienna held elections and in all four cases the FPÖ gained 
substantially, fueled in part by the anxieties surrounding the Refugee Crisis (Smale, 2015).  
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In Upper Austria there was a proportional representation system and it was a long-held 
stronghold for the ÖVP (Jenny, 2016, 23-24). The Land Governor, Josef Pühringer, was a 
member of the ÖVP and had been in office since 1995. He remained Governor, but returned with 
a 10.4 percentage point fall in votes for the ÖVP, totaling 36.4 percent, “the worst ever result for 
a returning ÖVP Land governor” (Jenny, 2016, 23-24). The SPÖ also suffered a devastating loss 
only obtaining 18.4 percent of the votes and a single seat in the Land parliament. Meanwhile the 
FPÖ surged ahead with 30.4 percent, doubling its previous result (Jenny, 2016, 23-24). As a 
result of the 2015 elections, the ÖVP and the FPÖ formed a coalition in Upper Austria.  
Styria had previously been governed by a coalition between the SPÖ and the ÖVP. Both 
parties suffered significantly in the 2015 elections. “In the Land election, the SPÖ obtained 29.3 
per cent (down 9.0 per cent) and the ÖVP 28.5 per cent (down 8.7 per cent), giving them 15 and 
14 seats, respectively. The FPÖ jumped to 26.8 per cent (up 16.1 per cent) and 14 seats 
(+8)” (Jenny, 2016, 22-23). Here also, the ÖVP and the FPÖ entered a coalition, but during 
negotiations the SPÖ also offered to form a coalition with the FPÖ (Salzmann, 2015). This offer 
of a coalition was striking as on the national level the SPÖ has been vocal about excluding the 
FPÖ.  
In Burgenland, the SPÖ’s willingness to cooperate with the FPÖ took an even more 
dramatic step. Both the SPÖ and the ÖVP had also lost footing, though the losses were slightly 
less dramatic, “the SPÖ obtained 41.9 per cent of the votes (down 6.3 per cent) and dropped to 
15 seats (a loss of three). The ÖVP obtained 29.1 per cent (down 5.5 per cent) and 11 seats 
(down two). The FPÖ obtained 15 per cent (up 6.1 per cent) and doubled its number of seats to 
six” (Jenny, 2016, ). The biggest change in Burgenland came with the coalition between the SPÖ 
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and the FPÖ. “The agreement triggered angry reactions in the SPÖ because it went against a 
party convention vote banning coalitions with the FPÖ. The SPÖ president of the Land diet gave 
a damning speech at the swearing-in of the new government and left the party.” (Jenny, 2016, 
22).  
 This coalition was remarkable on two levels. First, it signified a dramatic shift to the right 
in Burgenland’s SPÖ party. The coalition agreement called for strengthened regulations on 
asylum seekers and migrants, a core part of the FPÖ’s platform (Salzmann, 2015). Secondly, the 
coalition was a dramatic break at the Land level from the national party’s line. While a coalition 
between the SPÖ and the FPÖ was limited to Burgenland at the time, “…the coalition deal has 
national significance. It prepares the way for similar coalitions in other states, in the capital, 
Vienna, and at the federal level” (Salzmann, 2015). 
 Vienna also held Land elections in 2015. As with the previous cases, the FPÖ surged 
forward at the expense of the more mainstream parties and much of this success was tied to the 
recent rising fears surrounding immigration (Reuters, 2015). Vienna is traditionally an SPÖ 
stronghold, which for the most part held intact in 2015, “the SPÖ dropped to 39.6 per cent (down 
4.8 per cent) and 44 out of 100 seats. The FPÖ increased to 30.8 per cent (up 5.0 per cent) and 34 
seats. The Greens decreased slightly to 11.8 per cent (–0.8 per cent) and ten seats, but became the 
third-largest party as the ÖVP dropped to only 9.2 per cent (–4.8) and seven seats” (Jenny, 2016, 
26). In response to the election results, the SPÖ and the Greens formed a coalition.  
 As we see in Table 6 and the Land level, the FPÖ’s popularity was reduced in the early 
2000’s. Around 2010 the FPÖ’s electoral popularity began to return and around 2015 the party 
experienced a resurgence in popularity. This resurgence can be in part attributed to the 2015 
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Refugee Crisis in Europe. In 2015 911,000 refugees and migrants made their way to Europe, 
fleeing conflict in Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. Austria became one of the top 4 receiving 
countries in the EU and accepted 88,160 asylum seekers in 2015. The FPÖ capitalized on the 
fear and uncertainty surrounding the crisis with their anti-immigrant and welfare chauvinist 
platforms.  
4.3.3.Shifting Party Stances and the End of MMI 
 Based on the federal and Länder elections, it is clear to see that the FPÖ was in a much 
stronger position following 2015 then in 2010. In part this position was due to the salience of one 
of their core platforms: anti-immigration. The salience of this topic skyrocketed with the Refugee 
Crisis, but in this discussion, what is more important than why the FPÖ gained so much electoral 
success, is what impact did their success have? In the next section I will demonstrate that the 
FPÖ’s success pushed the mainstream parties in a welfare chauvinist direction. This change can 
be seen in the renegotiation of the MMI reform, which consequently ended because welfare 
chauvinist perspectives prevented a satisfactory agreement from being reached, unlike in 2010. 
In order to demonstrate the part shifts during MMI negotiations I will first detail what occurred 
on the Länder level, as they occurred first in 2015 and 2016, followed by an account of what 
happened on the federal level.  
4.3.3.1.Länder 
 The disillusionment of the MMI reform started on the Länder level. In Länder elections 
across Austria around 2015, the FPÖ made important electoral gains. These gains resulted in the 
FPÖ forming coalition governments with the ÖVP run Länder such as Upper Austria, Styria and 
Burgenland. As a result of these changes, negotiations floundered and Länder began altering their 
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social assistance schemes, even prior to the scheduled end of the MMI agreement (Fink, 2018). 
These changes were largely in the direction of retrenchment and retrenchment that targeted non-
natives. 
 Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Burgenland, Tyrol and Vienna all made significant cuts to 
their social assistance schemes effectively damming the MMI, but Lower Austria was one of the 
first to do so before the agreement had even officially ended. In Lower Austria, the Governor 
was a member of the ÖVP, making the decision to reduce benefit levels “(by approx. 30%) for all 
people, including Austrian citizens, who have been living in Austria for less than five years 
during the last six years, and an upper ceiling on [MMI] was introduced, amounting to €1,500 
per month per family/ household,” in 2017 not entirely surprising (Fink 2017). It is notable, 
however, that the move was publicly described by the Lower Austrian government as an effort to 
reduce the increased spending as a result of refugees and asylum seekers (Thalhammer, 2016). 
This anti-refugee and anti-immigrant welfare chauvinism has been a hallmark of the FPÖ’s 
campaign. In Lower Austria the ÖVP adopted the populist rhetoric of the FPÖ, even celebrating 
an increased emigration rate from the Land (Winroither, 2017). 
 Upper Austria was also a particularly interesting and strong example of the changes made 
by Länder to the MMI under the influence of the FPÖ. In Upper Austria in 2017, the benefit 
reductions specifically targeted asylum seekers and “benefits for individuals with only a brief 
history of residence in Austria,” and tied benefits to integration requirements such as German 
Language courses (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2020, 8). Using refugees as the motivation to reduce 
welfare benefits is not unique to Upper Austria, but the extent to which the policies actually 
target asylum seekers is. Legislation in Upper Austria specifically creates a separate system of 
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reduced benefits for foreigners without legally permanent residency, specifically temporary 
asylum seekers (Oö. Landtag,2016). This legislation was highly controversial in Austria and in 
the EU, even resulting in highly politicized court cases over the legality of the benefit reduction. 
 It cannot be surprising that after the FPÖ achieved significant electoral success on the 
Länder level that Länder began reducing welfare benefits in a decidedly welfare chauvinist style. 
During initial reform negotiations the ÖVP was not overly fond of this reform, but coalitions on 
the Länder and federal level enabled negotiations, as was long the foundation of Austrian 
politics. However, when the FPÖ gained popularity and presented as a viable coalition partner, 
the ÖVP could transition away from trying to limit the reforms of the SPÖ to welfare 
retrenchment under the FPÖ’s welfare chauvinist platform.  
  As was previously demonstrated, a single dissenting Länder can prevent 
negotiations. With so many Länder, outright altering the MMI reform, there is no clear path for 
negotiations to continue. Most of these dissenting Länder, have already appeared in previous 
sections as opposing the initial reform in 2010. This opposition was overcome because the SPÖ 
was able to pressure the ÖVP into cooperating on this reform due to its strength in coalitions on 
the federal and Länder level. Now in 2015, the pressure to negotiate from the SPÖ has been 
replaced by pressure from the FPÖ calling for the exclusion of non-Austrians from the system. 
4.3.3.2.Federal 
 It could be argued that after the Länder elections and subsequent changes to the MMI 
agreement that the negotiations were already at a dead end. It would be an incomplete analysis, 
however, to not include the breakdown of support on the national level, especially given the 
interplay between the federal level and the Länder. Austria had national elections in 2016 and 
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2017. In 2016, the presidential election did not focus on MMI as a platform point, though 
welfare chauvinism and anti-refugee sentiments were still a large presence in the FPÖ’s politics. 
In 2017, MMI did come in to play with the Parliamentary elections.  
 In 2016, Austria’s federal government was still a coalition between the SPÖ and the ÖVP, 
the coalition that initially passed the MMI reform. Länder politics do not happen in a vacuum 
and when Länder began prematurely altering their social assistance schemes against the                                                
MMI agreement, this sent clear signals to the national level. Instead of pressing for these 
technically illegal changes to be reversed, the SPÖ shifted towards the right by abandoning its 
position of being opposed to explicit benefit cuts and “signaled willingness to replace cash 
benefits by benefits in kind to some degree and proposed that beneficiaries of subsidiary 
protection and persons granted political asylum who receive [MMI] could be forced to live at a 
specific place in Austria (abolishing free choice of residence for this group)” (Fink, 2016). This 
is a definitive move by the SPÖ towards welfare limitation and a weakening of their earlier 
stances.  
 The SPÖ’s movement towards the right can further be seen with the 2017 elections. 
Based on the Manifesto Project welfare variable, the SPÖ’s score fell from 24.8 in 2013 to 21.4 
in 2017 (Volkens, 2019). This variable captures the overall party preference on welfare, which 
can be influenced by many factors. Even more definitive is the party’s indication that they would 
consider a coalition with the FPÖ (Bodlos, 2017, 1360). An SPÖ/FPÖ coalition has occurred on 
the federal level one time, from 1983 to 1987. At that time the FPÖ was a liberal party and his 
coalition was formed before Haider reinvented the FPÖ into the PRRP it is known as today in 
1986. An SPÖ/FPÖ coalition with the FPÖ as a PRRP has occurred on the Länder level in 
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Burgenland in 2015, but this was seen as a major break with the national party. The willingness 
of the SPÖ to consider forming a coalition with the FPÖ in order to gain office is significant and 
illustrates a definite willingness to shift in policies in response to the FPÖ’s electoral success. 
 The ÖVP also demonstrated a distinct shift towards welfare limitation and anti-immigrant 
rhetoric. When looking at the welfare variable from the Manifesto Project, it is clear that the 
ÖVP’s score has dropped from 12.2. to 10.9 from 2013 to 2017. It is important to note however, 
that this change is due to the ÖVP’s increase in mentions of welfare limitation rather than any 
change in their mentions of welfare expansion. This can be seen in comparing Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. 
  In the ÖVP’s 
2017 party manifesto 
there is a dramatic 
increase in mentions of 
welfare limitation, some 
of which speak 
specifically to MMI. 
The ÖVP specifically 
cites the policy goals of 
capping MMI minimum 
payments at 560 euros 
for 5 years for asylum 
seekers, compared to the proposed cap of 1,500 euros for all other beneficiaries (Österreichische 
Volkspartei, 2017). They also propose instituting harsher consequences for anyone found to be 
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misusing the benefit 
(Österreichische 
Volkspartei, 2017). 
 The overlap between 




“Media and political 
observers widely 
agreed that Kurz 
boosted his popularity 
mainly by undermining 
the FPÖ’s ownership 
of the immigration 
issue, and adopting many of the FPÖ’s policy positions during the election campaign. Kurz’s 
election campaign included proposals to close Islamic kindergartens and to cut social transfers to 
recognized refugees, reforms that the FPÖ also supports. Most prominently, Kurz claimed credit 
for the reduction in immigration to Europe after the closure of the Balkan route in 2016, which 
helped him convey the image of being competent on the immigration issue.,” (Bodlos, 2018).  
Noting the FPÖ’s success in 2013 and the popularity of the FPÖ’s anti-immigrant/anti-refugee 
stance given the 2015 refugee crisis, the ÖVP apparently tried to undercut the FPÖ’s lead by 
adopting these platforms leading up to the 2017 election. Even without holding significant 
electoral power, here the FPÖ has influenced the platform of one of Austria’s main stream 
parties.  
 After the elections in 2017 the FPÖ and the ÖVP formed a coalition government. As with 
all Austrian governments before them, they released a program detailing their plans for their 
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elected term. In this program, an entire section was dedicated to the reform of the social 
assistance program,. The program framed the need to reform as a need to prevent immigrants and 
asylum seekers from abusing the welfare system (Zusammen, 2017). The program listed desired 
reforms that would toughen requirements for all beneficiaries, but also target non-Austrians by 
specifically reducing the benefits given to asylum seekers, requiring beneficiaries to have long 
term residence in Austria, and expanding integration class requirements to access benefits 
(Zusammen, 2017). It is important to remember that through all of these changes, at no point did 
the FPÖ have a majority of seats in parliament, meaning the success of welfare chauvinist 
policies is only possible if the other parties participate (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2020, 8). It is clear in 
this coalition that the ÖVP willing to target asylum seekers and other non-natives in order to 
pursue welfare limiting policies.  
 In 2018, the Austrian Government, led by an FPÖ/ÖVP coalition, went as far as to 
announce a draft bill acting on their goals outlined in 2017. This bill proposed tying MMI 
benefits to German language skills and the completion of an integration agreement (Fink, 2018). 
It would also effectively legislate that “MMI should only be granted to citizens of other EU 
Member States or those from third countries after five years of Austrian residency” (Fink, 2018). 
This draft bill demonstrated that the ÖVP’s commitment to supporting the FPÖ’s welfare 
chauvinist policies goes beyond it being a campaign/office seeking tool and into the realm of real 
action and legislation.  
 The ÖVP’s slide to the right and willingness to pursue welfare chauvinist policies 
continued into 2019. In the party’s 2019 manifesto, which captures the party’s policy preferences 
as it is not a coalition document, it again targets immigrants and refugees for abusing the welfare 
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system (ÖVP, 2019). The party also put forward concrete policy ideas in the same vein such as a 
task force to review immigrant benefits, tighter restrictions on benefits for asylum seekers and 
requiring refugees to participate in active labour market policies such as job training (ÖVP, 2019; 
Ennser-Jedenastik, 2020). 
In the 2015, 2016 and 2017 elections in Austria the FPÖ experienced a resurgence in 
popularity on the federal and the Länder level. It is impossible to say what may have happened to 
the MMI reform if the FPÖ had not been so successful. However, it is clear that after these 
elections the SPÖ was more willing to negotiate on welfare retrenchment and even to form a 
coalition with the FPÖ. Likewise, after these elections the ÖVP increased their support for 
welfare reduction, particularly reductions that targeted asylum seekers and refugees. These 
changes made renegotiating the MMI impossible and point to the FPÖ being a powerful 
influence in Austrian politics without having to achieve majority support.  
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CHAPTER FIVE DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The electoral success of FPÖ and its participation in government at the federal and 
Länder levels has reshaped Austrian social policy in Austria. In this thesis, I have demonstrated 
this change in the mainstream Austrian parties by tracing the inception and then failure of the 
MMI reform. As the timeline demonstrates, after the FPÖ’s failed coalition with the ÖVP in the 
early 2000s, the party lost a significant number of supporters and entered into an electoral slump. 
This decline in the FPÖ’s influence allowed the mainstream Austrian parties to return to a 
political landscape more similar to how it looked before the rise of the FPÖ, when grand 
coalitions and negotiations formed the bases of Austria’s system. The SPÖ was electorally 
successful, controlling both the Presidency and Parliament. As a result, the SPÖ was able to 
pressure the ÖVP into cooperating in negotiations on the MMI. As a result, the negotiations were 
successful and the reform was implemented in 2010.  
In 2015 the ‘refugee crisis’ brought on anxieties surrounding immigration and asylum 
seekers across Europe. In Austria the FPÖ was able to capitalize on these fears which manifested 
in electoral success across all levels of government. As a result of their success, the 
corresponding weakness of the SPÖ, and the FPÖ’s their commitment to welfare chauvinism the 
MMI agreement began to fall apart. Länder began making changes to their social assistance 
systems before the agreement’s term ended, effectively ending any hopes of renegotiating the 
agreement. Then the ÖVP and the FPÖ formed a coalition and made reforming the MMI to a 
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more restrictive system, especially targeting asylum seekers. This was certainly the death-nail to 
any hopes of maintaining the SPÖ’s MMI reform.  
It is important to note that at no point in this process did the FPÖ have a controlling 
majority of seat in the Parliament, the Presidency or control over the majority of the Länder. 
However, in a system built on cooperation between two centrist parties, the success of a third 
radical party disrupted traditional cooperation. The FPÖ’s influence also shifted the Overton 
Window and encouraged office seeking parties to shift their policies in the direction of the PRRP. 
In the case of Austria, the shift was toward the right and towards welfare chauvinism and welfare 
limitation, specifically for refugees and asylum seekers.  
In such a complex political system, there are many moving parts and parties are 
influenced by a number of factors. By nature, this analysis leaves significant room for further 
investigation. One clear avenue would be to expand on the role of the SPÖ, not only in the 
creation of the MMI reform, but in Austrian social policy as a whole. The discussion could be 
reframed to consider the SPÖ as the defining factor in the Mmi being passed, rather than the FPÖ 
being the impetus for its failure. Potentially, instead of focusing on the how the FPÖ’s influence 
disrupted negotiations, a research could investigate how the SPÖ was able to overcome so many 
veto points, such as Länder, inherent in the Austrian federalist system. Likewise, the SPÖ was 
able to hold successful negotiations, despite dissent on the federal and Länder levels without a 
majority in the Nationalrat and with only a small number of seats more than the ÖVP. When the 
SPÖ lost their footing in the Nationalrat, the negotiations were no longer viable. Future research 
should be done to determine the role of the SPÖ in social policy reform in Austria.  
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GLOSSARY 
• Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung- Full Austrian name of the MMI Reform
• Bund- Federal Government
• Bundesrat- Also known as the Federal Council, it is the section of Austria’s bicameral 
parliament that represents Länder interests
• BZÖ- Alliance for the Future of Austria, PRRP
• FPÖ- The Freedom Party of Austria, PRRP
• Gemeinden- Municipal Government
• Generalklausel- Clause in the Austrian Constitution that outlines Länder and Federal 
competencies
• Läger- This refers to the two mainstream parties in Austria and their camps
• Länder- Subnational governing bodies within Austria, they could be compared to states in the 
United States
• Landeshauptmännerkonferenz- The Conference of Land Governors, a regular conference that 
facilitates informal cooperation between Länder and the federal government
• MMI- Means Tested Minimum Income Reform
• Nationalrat- Also known as the National Assembly, this is the other section of Austria’s 
bicameral parliament. This section is the main legislative body and representatives are elected.
• ÖVP- The People’s Party of Austria, Mainstream Party
• PRRP- Populist Radical Right Party
• Sozialhilfe- The social assistance scheme in Austria that proceeded MMI.
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